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THE EXPANSION OF LIMITED LIABILITY 
PROTECTION IN THE CORPORATE FORM: 
THE AFTERMATH OF KIOBEL V. ROYAL 
DUTCH PETROLEUM CO. 
Corporate alien tort was always a foundling doctrine. It came into the 
world as the presumed child of the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Kadic v. Karadzic in 1995, but its birth was never confirmed by 
a definitive appellate review. Now, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, the 2nd 
Circuit has declared the doctrine dead. The human rights lawyers who had 
adopted it are in a state of mourning.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Royal Dutch Shell plc, Exxon Mobil Corporation, and BP p.l.c. were 
each listed in the top five of Fortune Magazine’s world’s biggest companies 
of 2010 in terms of revenue, but they share something in common beyond 
their rivalry in the oil industry and their multibillion dollar profits.2 Each 
enterprise has faced recent lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs under the 
Alien Tort Statute3 (ATS).4 The ATS has traditionally provided a 
mechanism for aliens5 to bring claims against individuals and corporations 
for tortious conduct committed abroad.6 The statute expressly grants subject 
matter jurisdiction to United States district courts7 and provides the 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Michael Goldhaber, The Life and Death of the Corporate Alien Tort, LAW.COM (Oct. 12, 
2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202473215797 
[hereinafter Goldhaber, Life and Death]. 
 2. Global 500, CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/ 
full_list/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2010) (determining 2010 corporate profits: $12,518 million (Royal 
Dutch); $19,280 million (Exxon Mobil); $16,578 million (BP)). 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Saad Gul, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court 
Taketh Away: An Assessment of Corporate Liability Under § 1350, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 379, 380 
(2007) (citing Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Supreme Court Meets International Law: What’s the 
Sequel to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain?, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 77, 77 (2004) (stating that the 
ATS is also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act by commentators who believe that the statute 
incorporates causes of action)). 
 4. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010); Khulumani v. Barclay 
Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (naming BP as defendant); Doe v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 84 (9th ed. 2009) (defining alien as “a person who was born 
outside the jurisdiction of the United States, who is subject to some foreign government, and who 
has not been naturalized under U.S. law”). 
 6. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 161 n.12 (Leval, J., concurring) (citing Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 
F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009)) (holding that alleged non-consensual medical experimentation by a 
corporate defendant stated a claim under the ATS). But see id. at 120 (majority opinion) (holding 
that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the ATS against corporations); Romero v. Drummond 
Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[t]he text of the Alien Tort Statute 
provides no express exception for corporations . . . and the law of this Circuit is that [the ATS] 
grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate defendants”). 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
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opportunity for victims to be awarded “domestic remedies.”8 Enacted as 
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS was initially ignored by 
attorneys and was infrequently utilized for over 170 years.9 It was not until 
the early 1980s, after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,10 that courts saw a rise in 
ATS litigation. Starting in 1997, the ATS became a tool for human rights 
groups to bring claims against domestic and international “corporations for 
‘aiding and abetting’ human rights violations by foreign governments.”11 
While mining and energy industries have been targets for ATS 
litigation, approximately 150 ATS complaints have been brought against 
various businesses and industries.12 While few ATS claims against 
corporate defendants go to trial,13 approximately seventeen disputes have 
been settled before trial for amounts as high as $5.25 billion.14 As such, 
                                                                                                                           
 8. Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 
61 (2008). 
 9. Sean Wajert, Second Circuit Upholds Dismissal of Alien Tort Statute Claim Against 
Corporate Defendants, MASSTORTDEFENSE (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.masstortdefense.com/ 
2010/09/articles/second-circuit-upholds-dismissal-of-alien-tort-statute-claim-against-corporate-
defendants/. 
 10. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 11. John B. Bellinger III, Shortening the Long Arm of the Law, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 9, 
2010, at 8. 
 12. Goldhaber, Life and Death, supra note 1 (reporting on claims brought under the ATS 
against clothing retailers for sweatshop allegations and Ford Motor Co. and General Motors Co. 
for their roles in supporting apartheid in South Africa). 
 13. Some disagreement exists regarding the number of corporate liability ATS cases that have 
gone to trial. Compare Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether 
Transnational Corporations are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute, 31 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 385, 400–01 (2010) (stating that only two ATS cases have gone to trial, 
including Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008), and Bowoto v. Chevron 
Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008)), with Judith Chomsky, Will the Real ATS Please 
Stand Up?, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 461, 465–66 (2010) (finding only three corporate 
ATS cases have gone to trial: Jama v. U.S.I.N.S., 343 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D. N.J. 2004), Estate of 
Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003) and Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 
2d. 1080), and Marc J. Gottridge & Matthew J. Galvin, The Alien Tort Statute: An Introduction 
and Current Topics, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 2010, at 112–13 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. 
Course Handbook Ser. No. 25100) (2010) (determining that three ATS cases against corporations 
have gone to trial: Rodriguez, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d. 1080, and 
Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 2d 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
 14. Some of these settlements include:  
Holocaust agreements ($5.25 billion from German state and industry, $1.25 billion 
from Swiss banks and $210 million from Austrian state and industry); . . . $30 million 
from Unocal for Burmese pipeline allegations; . . . $20 million from U.S. clothing 
retailers for Saipan sweatshop allegations; and $15.5 million . . . [for] Shell’s activity in 
the Niger delta.  
Goldhaber, Life and Death, supra note 1. See also Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 13, at 113–14 
(listing other settlements involving corporate defendants in ATS cases). 
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liability under the ATS can have significant financial consequences 
regardless of whether the lawsuit proceeds to the trial stage.15 
For thirteen years, courts preserved the possibility of holding corporate 
defendants liable under the ATS.16 However, on September 17, 2010, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the theory of corporate ATS 
liability.17 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit held 
that corporate liability is not a universally recognized norm of international 
law and therefore claims against corporate defendants are beyond the scope 
of the ATS’ jurisdictional purview.18 
This note will argue that corporate liability should be preserved under 
the ATS despite the Kiobel holding. Part I will examine the language of the 
statute, distinguishing what the text directly states from what it does not 
address. The influence of relevant legislative history will also be discussed. 
Part II will explore how various courts have interpreted the ATS when 
evaluating corporate liability and these courts’ holdings. Part III will 
examine the Second Circuit’s opinion in Kiobel, including the concurring 
opinion of Judge Leval. Part IV will discuss how the Kiobel majority’s 
holding and reasoning are flawed, and will offer predictions regarding the 
case’s potential impact on corporate liability claims.  
I. THE STATUTE’S LANGUAGE AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
The Alien Tort Statute allows courts in the United States to hear cases 
involving human rights violations19 that have been committed abroad and to 
provide “domestic remedies.”20 Characterized as a unique jurisdictional 
statute,21 §1350 contains three requirements in order to establish federal 
subject matter jurisdiction: “(1) an alien sues, (2) for a tort, (3) committed 
‘in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.’”22 
                                                                                                                           
 15. See Rosaleen T. O’Gara, Note, Procedural Dismissals Under the Alien Tort Statute, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 797, 800–03, 808–09 (2010) (stating how high discovery costs and settlement 
agreements contribute to costs under the ATS). 
 16. Id. at 804–15 (arguing that cases dealing with corporate ATS liability have been dismissed 
on procedural grounds, particularly forum non conveniens, political question, comity, and 
heightened pleading standard, thus leading to a gap in definitive adjudication of substantive issues 
under the ATS). See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 153–54 (2d Cir. 
2010) (Leval, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s finding that international law 
provides no basis for corporate liability yet dismissing the complaint as it did not meet the 
pleading requirements). 
 17. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120 (rejecting corporate liability under the ATS). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Goldhaber, Life and Death, supra note 1 (finding that human rights lawyers have 
adopted the ATS in order to fight allegations of human rights abuses abroad).  
 20. Keitner, supra note 8, at 61. 
 21. Judge Cabranes begins the majority opinion in Kiobel by noting the ATS is “a 
jurisdictional provision unlike any other in American law and of a kind apparently unknown to 
any other legal system in the world.” Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 115. 
 22. Vega, supra note 13, at 417 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)). 
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A. REQUIRED STATUTORY ELEMENTS 
Under the first criterion, the statute makes clear who can initiate a 
lawsuit—“an alien.” However, the statute does not specify the identity of a 
defendant and does not even require that the defendant be a United States 
citizen.23 The statute similarly does not exclude corporations as potential 
defendants.24 
The second element states that torts, generally, fall within the ATS. 
However, the statute has been interpreted as a jurisdictional statute that does 
not create causes of action. Instead, the Supreme Court has held that the 
common law is the source of causes of action for international law 
violations.25 As a result, no guidance is provided by the statutory language 
to differentiate between civil and criminal conduct.26 Instead, courts have 
been left with the necessary role of considering which claims are included 
within ATS liability, and they have approached this task with caution.27 
Originally,28 three specific offenses were held to be appropriate causes of 
action: “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.”29 Arguably, if Congress had wanted to restrict 
the application of the ATS to particular defendants or to criminal rather than 
civil offenses, qualifying language could have been provided.30 However, 
Congress failed to incorporate such structural limitations. 
The last requirement under §1350—that the committed tortious act be 
“in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”—does 
not indicate what source defines the “law of nations.” Instead, courts have 
held that “norm[s] of customary international law”31 that are “specific, 
universal, and obligatory,”32 provide the appropriate foundation for 
determining offenses that fit within the statutory framework. The inevitable 
difficulty with this standard is that, “the absence of an international law-
maker and an international court with compulsory universal jurisdiction 
entails that many rules are not clear, particularly when they are of 
                                                                                                                           
 23. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction & Legal History in Support 
of Plaintiffs-Appellants Seeking Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 06-4800-CV, 06-4876-CV) [hereinafter Brief of 
Professors]; JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32118, THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS 10 (2003). 
 24. Brief of Professors, supra note 23, at 3. 
 25. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
 26. Brief of Professors, supra note 23. 
 27. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–29. 
 28. Originally in this framework corresponds to cases from 1789 until 1980. 
 29. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 68 (The Univ. of Chicago Press 2002) (1769)). 
 30. Brief of Professors, supra note 23, at 7 (“Congress knew how to limit the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts with regards to conduct and the identity of defendants.”). 
 31. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738. 
 32. Id. at 732 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th 
Cir. 1994)). 
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customary origin, and are thus open to differing interpretations.”33 
Therefore, there has been a “need for courts gradually to spell out the 
contents of those rules.”34 Courts might consider offenses that violate the 
terms of a treaty which the U.S. has signed and executed as the basis for 
such actions.  However, while seemingly more concrete than norms of 
international law, most treaties do not inherently provide for private rights 
or cover the range of offenses contemplated by the ATS.35 Only after 
Congress enacts legislation that corresponds to offenses in such treaties 
might courts gain jurisdiction to enforce private rights under it.36 
B. VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
The text of the ATS reads, “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”37 
Considering the statute is only one sentence long, legislative history is 
necessary and helpful in illuminating the meaning of the text. 
Unfortunately, little if any record of congressional debate38 regarding 
private actions or private remedies under the ATS is available.39 As a result, 
legal commentators and scholars have proposed a number of rationales to 
explain why Congress chose to adopt the ATS.40 
The ATS was established by the First Congress at a time when both the 
federal and state governments were beginning to consider their roles and the 
role of the judiciary in foreign affairs.41 The Judiciary Act of 1789 was a 
direct result of these debates. It created a court system in accordance with 
Article III of the Constitution.42 As a young nation, it was particularly 
important for the United States to provide a consistent means of redress to 
aliens so as to maintain good relationships with foreign governments.43 
When the Judiciary Act was enacted, “the First Congress thought it crucial 
to provide a federal forum to discharge the duty of the nation, to avoid 
                                                                                                                           
 33. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 278 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., 
concurring) (quoting Antonio Cassese, The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 585, 590 (2004)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. ELSEA, supra note 23, at 15. 
 36. Id. (describing treaties as “non-self-executing” bases for establishing jurisdiction). 
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 38. ELSEA, supra note 23, at 2 (arguing that the “Alien Tort Claims Act” is a misnomer 
because it “impl[ies] that Congress passed the measure as a separate act, in which case one would 
expect to find legislative documents from which Congress’ intent might readily be divined. . . . 
[and this] is not the case”). 
 39. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 (2004); Tim Kline, Note, A Door Ajar or a 
Floodgate?: Corporate Liability After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 94 KY. L.J. 691, 692 (2005–
2006). 
 40. See ELSEA, supra note 23, at 2; Brief of Professors, supra note 23. 
 41. See U.S. CONST. art. III, IV; ELSEA, supra note 23, at 2. 
 42. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. 
 43. ELSEA, supra note 23, at 9. 
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potentially hostile state courts, and to promote uniform interpretation when 
dealing with violations of the law of nations.”44 
Some have hypothesized that the United States, seeking to gain global 
respect, recognized a need to create a remedial system to address tortious 
misconduct that has not only harmed individual victims but jeopardized the 
United States’ relationship with foreign nations.45 Since few torts were 
initially considered to be of international significance,46 some theorists have 
concluded that the ATS was designed to focus on the protection of 
diplomats and foreign ambassadors, exclusively.47 Supporters of this view 
highlight two historical episodes in which ambassadors were attacked in the 
United States and after which Congress sought to reaffirm foreign 
diplomatic protection through the ATS.48 Yet, since Congress sought 
criminal action in those cases—rather than civil damages as provided for 
under the ATS—this theory has been met with opposition.49 
Seeking either criminal or civil liability nevertheless demonstrates an 
interest in safeguarding foreign relations.50 Congress likely recognized that 
such relationships would be most vulnerable during wartime and may have 
drafted the ATS to cover “law of prize” cases—which include the capture 
and ownership of seized vessels and cargo during wartime—with this 
reality in mind.51 Beyond the war context, commentators have further 
suggested that the ATS offers courts, regardless of location, universal 
jurisdiction over egregious violations of international law, particularly those 
that are considered hostis humani generis.52 
II. COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS 
In 2004, the Supreme Court considered ATS liability for the first and 
only time.53 Rather than provide a clear standard for subsequent district and 
circuit courts to follow, the Court left a number of questions unanswered.54 
                                                                                                                           
 44. Brief of Professors, supra note 23. 
 45. Kline, supra note 39, at 693. 
 46. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 47. ELSEA, supra note 23, at 8–9. 
 48. Id. (discussing the “Marbois Affair” in which the French Consul General was attacked in 
Philadelphia and the arrest of a servant at the Dutch ambassador’s home in New York which vi-
olated diplomatic immunity standards). 
 49. Id. at 9. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 10 (suggesting the existence under the ATS of universal jurisdiction over conduct 
that is against all mankind including slave trading and piracy). Elsea defined hostis humani 
generis as “enemies of all humanity.” Id. 
 53. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 54. Richard M. Buxbaum & David D. Caron, The Alien Tort Statute: An Overview of the 
Current Issues, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 511, 512–13 (2010) (discussing how Sosa has created 
new questions regarding ATS liability). See also Kline, supra note 39, at 699–701. 
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As a result, courts are split in how they approach ATS liability.55 
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain involved the capture, torture, and subsequent 
murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent who was on 
assignment in Mexico.56 DEA officials in the United States believed that 
Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez), a Mexican doctor, facilitated the interrogation 
process by prolonging the agent’s life in order to extend the torture efforts.57 
After a warrant was issued, the DEA hired Mexican nationals to transport 
Alvarez to the United States for trial.58 Alvarez was later acquitted and 
returned to Mexico where he filed suit against the United States under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)59 and against Sosa, a Mexican national 
who had assisted in Alvarez’s involuntary transportation to the United 
States, for a violation of the law of nations under the ATS.60 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Souter, 
interpreted the ATS to include a combination of “expansive and restrictive 
terms.”61 The Court held that the ATS provided federal jurisdiction to hear a 
limited number of claims that are “defined by the law of nations and 
recognized at common law.”62 More precisely, the court limited the 
jurisdictional scope to claims that “rest on a norm of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to 
the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”63 As a 
result, Alvarez’s “single illegal detention of less than a day, . . . transfer of 
custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment” did not violate 
such a norm.64 
While Sosa provided some guidance on the proper application of the 
ATS, it did not establish a standard specific for corporate liability.65 There 
is, however, a brief acknowledgment of the potential for corporate liability 
                                                                                                                           
 55. Linda A. Willett et al., The Alien Tort Statute and Its Implications for Multinational 
Corporations, BRIEFLY…PERSP. ON LEGIS., REG., & LITIG., Sept. 2003, at 1, 16. 
 56. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 697–98. 
 59. Id. at 698. The government’s motion to dismiss the FTCA claim was granted and upheld 
by the Court holding “that the FTCA’s foreign country exception bars all claims based on any 
injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred.” Id. 
at 712. 
 60. Id. at 698. 
 61. Brief of Professors, supra note 23, at 7 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718). 
 62. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.  
 63. Id. at 725. 
 64. Id. at 738. 
 65. Defendants included: Sosa, Mexican citizen; Garate-Bustamante, DEA operative; five 
unnamed Mexican civilians; the United States; four DEA agents. Id. at 698. Therefore, no 
allegations were brought against corporations. Alvarez filed suit under the ATS, Torture Victim 
Protection Act and the FTCA. Id. at 698. 
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in footnote 20 of the majority’s opinion.66 Lower courts have been forced to 
wrestle with this footnote’s scope.67 
B. LOWER COURT CASES WITH CORPORATE DEFENDANTS 
The Supreme Court’s failure to determine whether or not corporations 
could be held liable under the ATS has led to mixed results in courts that 
have addressed this issue.68 Some cases suggest that directors and officers 
of corporations, for example, can be deemed direct perpetrators of 
international human rights violations and be held individually liable under 
the ATS.69 In order for corporations themselves to be liable, courts would 
be required to recognize some form of entity-based liability within the 
jurisdictional framework of ATS, including respondeat superior or aiding 
and abetting.70 
1. Second Circuit: Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd. 
The Second Circuit analyzed whether aiding and abetting could 
establish liability under the ATS in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank 
Ltd.71 Plaintiffs claimed that defendants (fifty named corporations and 
hundreds of unidentified corporations) collaborated with the South African 
government to maintain its apartheid system.72 Since the issue of corporate 
ATS liability was not raised by defendants, the court did not base its 
decision on that issue.73 Still, the establishment of aiding and abetting 
                                                                                                                           
 66. Id. at 732 n.20 (“A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of 
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private 
actor such as a corporation or individual.”). 
 67. Joel Slawotsky, Doing Business Around the World: Corporate Liability Under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act, 2005 MICH ST. L. REV. 1065, 1078. 
 68. See Paul R. Dubinsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United States, 58 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 455, 466 (2010). 
 69. E.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 122 (2d. Cir. 2010). See also 
Ben Kerschberg, Corporate Executives: Get Ready for a Billion Dollar Lawsuit, 
HUFFINGTONPOST (Dec. 2, 2010, 5:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-
kerschberg/corporate-executives-get-_b_791292.html (suggesting that directors and officers will 
become targets of ATS litigation). 
 70. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(recognizing application of aiding and abetting in the ATS context); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 
232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding jurisdiction could be extended beyond state actors to private 
actors under the ATS); Chomsky, supra note 13, at 462–63 (suggesting that corporate liability 
under the ATS required the establishment of vicarious liability); Vega, supra note 13, at 388–89 
(even though ATS litigation has focused on human rights violations, it has been suggested that the 
ATS may provide a mechanism for alien plaintiffs to litigate claims of bribery); Kline, supra note 
39, at 696 (describing claims brought against corporations based on “vicarious liability, direct 
liability, and aiding and abetting”). 
 71. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260. 
 72. Id. at 258. 
 73. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124 (citing Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 282–83) (Katzmann, J., 
concurring)). 
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liability arguably provides a mechanism for plaintiffs to bring claims 
against corporate entities for their directors’ and officers’ conduct. 
The district court initially held “that aiding and abetting violations of 
customary international law cannot provide a basis for [ATS] 
jurisdiction.”74 The district court, therefore, dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.75 The district court based its holding, in 
part, on a “Statement of Interest” from the U.S. Department of State which 
suggested that aiding and abetting liability under the ATS would 
“potentially [have] serious adverse consequences for significant interests of 
the United States.”76 This decision was subsequently vacated by the Second 
Circuit, which held that aiding and abetting could constitute a form of 
liability under the ATS.77 However, as demonstrated by Judges Katzmann, 
Hall, and Korman’s separate opinions, the panel was unable to agree on the 
required standard. “‘The upshot of this split [in Khulumani] is that 
notwithstanding the agreement of two judges, Judge Katzmann’s view [of 
aiding and abetting liability] did not constitute a holding and is therefore 
not binding precedent . . .[and] the issue remains live.’”78 
Judge Katzmann argued that the district court over emphasized 
prudential concerns, including foreign policy considerations.79 Katzmann 
canvassed various sources of international law to determine whether, as 
required by Sosa, the requisite “universal recognition” of aiding and 
abetting liability existed in the international community. From the London 
Charter . . . to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) . . . 
[and] Rwanda (ICTR) . . . [he] noted that aiding and abetting has been 
repeatedly recognized as an accepted form of liability.80 
Categorizing the South African government as the principal and 
Barclay National Bank Ltd. as the agent, the Rome Statute was viewed as 
particularly instructive in determining a standard for aiding and abetting.81 
Katzmann concluded that in order to establish aiding and abetting liability, 
a defendant needed to: “(1) provide[] practical assistance to the principal 
                                                                                                                           
 74. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260. 
 75. Id. at 259 (denying plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 260. 
 78. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 104 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 100, 120 (John R. Crook ed., 2010) (quoting Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009)). See also Michael Garvey, Comment, Corporate 
Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Legislative Prerogative, 29 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. 381, 384–85 (2009) (discussing the absence of an established standard for 
aiding and abetting liability). 
 79. Garvey, supra note 78, at 389–90 (discussing Katzmann’s evaluation of the district court’s 
treatment of aiding and abetting liability). 
 80. Id. at 390 (citation omitted). 
 81. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 275–77 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
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which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and (2) does 
so with the purpose[82] of facilitating the commission of that crime.”83 
Judge Korman, concurring in part and dissenting in part, also analyzed 
the existence of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS and the 
appropriate standard to employ when determining this form of liability.84 
While agreeing with Katzmann’s purpose standard, Korman favored greater 
deference to the United States and international governments who opposed 
expanding ATS liability than did Katzmann.85 In addition, Korman 
distinguished corporate and individual defendants, arguing that aiding and 
abetting liability did not apply to corporate entities.86 
2. Second Circuit: Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc. 
The Second Circuit’s standard for aiding and abetting in Khulumani 
was affirmed in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.87 
Here, the Second Circuit held that substantial assistance, with the purpose 
of aiding in the unlawful conduct, was required to establish ATS liability.88 
Talisman Energy involved allegations that Talisman aided and abetted, 
or conspired with the Sudan government, in committing human rights 
abuses.89 At this time, Talisman had purchased Arakis Energy Corporation, 
the owner of oil development rights in Sudan and a member of an energy 
company consortium.90 When considering the purchase, Talisman was 
assured by Sudanese officials of the region’s “safety, security, and peace” 
even though Arakis’ head of security and Freedom Quest International each 
advised Talisman not to invest.91 
The energy company consortium subsequently built all-weather roads 
and upgraded airstrips to enhance business operations.92 Regardless of 
Talisman’s efforts to limit their use, the new infrastructure was used by the 
Sudanese government for military activities.93 In addition, the government 
                                                                                                                           
 82. On the other hand, Judge Hall felt knowledge was sufficient with respect to intent. Id. at 
288–89 (Hall, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. at 277. 
 84. Id. at 330 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 85. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 102 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 155, 185 (John R. Crook ed., 2008). 
 86. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 321 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(rejecting Judge Katzmann’s assertion that there is “no distinction between a corporation and an 
individual” because “the specific issue of corporate liability under customary international law” 
was not litigated in any prior ATS cases and thus is not precedential). 
 87. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 247. 
 90. Id. at 248–49. 
 91. Id. at 249. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 250. 
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allegedly created buffer zones around the oil facilities, forcefully removing 
civilians from the area.94  
Plaintiffs alleged that Talisman aided and abetted, or conspired95 in, the 
killing of civilians.96 While the Second Circuit previously addressed the 
standard for ATS aiding and abetting liability against international banks 
and corporations in Khulumani,97 its reasoning in that case was 
nonbinding.98 Given this context, the Second Circuit held that purpose, 
rather than knowledge, was required to make out an action for aiding and 
abetting99—as well as for conspiratorial—liability.100 
However, the Second Circuit failed to consider whether corporate 
liability could exist for violations of customary international law, stating 
“[b]ecause we hold that plaintiffs’ claims fail on other grounds, we need not 
reach, in this action, the question of ‘whether international law extends the 
scope of liability’ to corporations.”101 While the Supreme Court recently 
had the opportunity to define corporate ATS liability, they declined to 
review Talisman Energy.102 
3. Eleventh Circuit: Romero v. Drummond Company, Inc. 
Other circuits103 have addressed and analyzed the ATS’ jurisdiction 
over a corporate defendant, including the Eleventh Circuit. In Romero v. 
Drummond Company, Inc., members of a Colombian trade union and 
relatives of deceased union leaders alleged that the president of Drummond, 
Ltd., a Colombian subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, had paid paramilitary 
agents to assassinate union leaders.104 Claims were brought against the 
                                                                                                                           
 94. Id.  
 95. Conspiracy liability involves “[a]n agreement by two or more persons to commit an 
unlawful act.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 351 (9th ed. 2009). 
 96. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 247. 
 97. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 98. See supra note 78. 
 99. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 259. The court addressed aiding and abetting liability 
because the claims were associated predominantly with criminal charges rather than civil 
proceedings. Id. at 257 n.7. 
 100. Id. at 260. 
 101. Id. at 261 n.12 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)). 
Interestingly, in the district court, defendants had moved for a judgment on the pleadings. They 
argued that the decisions in Sosa and Flores required that the court reconsider: (1) whether 
“corporations can be liable for violating the ATS;” and (2) whether “accessorial liability” falls 
within the ATS. Id. at 251. The district court denied the motion. Id. 
 102. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244, cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010). 
 103. “The split in opinions rendered by the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits is illustrative of 
the struggle between finding a jurisdictional basis for such suits and taking into account the 
potential impact on foreign relations.” Willett et al., supra note 55. 
 104. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008). Claims were brought 
under both the ATS and the Torture Act. Id. The court distinguishes the two statutes, explaining 
that ATS is jurisdictional without creating causes of action, while the Torture Act “provides a 
cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing” without granting jurisdiction. Id. at 1315. As a 
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parent company, its subsidiary, and company executives.105 Drummond 
argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS to 
hear suits against corporations.106 Couching its decision in precedent, the 
court held that “[t]he text of the [ATS] provides no express exception for 
corporations . . . and the law of this Circuit is that this statute grants 
jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate defendants.”107 
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit had previously permitted claims for 
aiding and abetting liability under the ATS.108 Although a jury verdict in 
favor of defendant was affirmed, 109 the Eleventh Circuit has, as a result of 
its prior holdings, gained a reputation for being “one of the most [ATS] 
plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions.”110 
4. Central District of California: Doe v. Nestle 
Another court has recently explored corporate liability claims in dicta 
even after resolving the case on other grounds.111 In Doe v. Nestle, 
allegations of forced child labor on cocoa fields in Côte d’Ivoire were 
brought against Nestle.112 The district court held that,  
corporations . . . may not presently be sued under Sosa and the [ATS]. 
There is no support in the relevant sources of international law for the 
proposition that corporations are legally responsible for international law 
violations. International law is silent on this question . . . . [A]ll of the 
available international law materials apply only to states or natural 
persons.113 
                                                                                                                           
result, defects in pleading claims under the ATS are jurisdictional defects and therefore should be 
addressed first in order to “reach the merits of the appeal.” Id. at 1314. 
 105. Id. at 1309. 
 106. While this note focuses on issues under the ATS, Drummond alleges issues under both the 
ATS and the Torture Act. Id. at 1309. He claimed the following subject matter jurisdiction issues:  
Drummond first argues that neither the Torture Act nor the Alien Tort Statute allows 
suits against corporations. Drummond next argues that these Acts do not provide claims 
for aiding and abetting. Finally, Drummond argues that the Torture Act provides the 
exclusive cause of action for extrajudicial killing in violation of international law. 
Id. at 1314. Similarly, Drummond presents four additional issues relating to partial summary 
judgment and issues relating to evidentiary and discovery rulings of the lower court, which will 
not be discussed here. 
 107. Id. at 1315 (citing Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1242 (11th 
Cir.2005)). 
 108. Id. (citing Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 109. This court did not examine whether or not international law provided the framework to 
approve the proposed cause of action. 
 110. Memorandum from Baker Botts LLP, Alien Tort Statute Update: Two Recent Appellate 
Decisions Affect Alien Tort Statute Cases Against Corporations (Jan. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/AlienTortStatuteJanuary09.htm. 
 111. Doe v. Nestle, No. CV 05-5133 SVW (JTLx), 2010 WL 3969615, at *57 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
8, 2010). 
 112. Id. at *1–4. 
 113. Id. at *74. 
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The district court’s analysis in Nestle begins at the typical starting 
point, Sosa, and continues by exploring the “well-defined, universally-
accepted international law” requirement.114 Finding that Sosa stands for the 
proposition that only international law is the appropriate barometer to 
define the scope of liability, the court determined that utilizing domestic 
common law would be “imperial[istic].”115 The district court did 
acknowledge that courts have taken different approaches when evaluating 
the international law standard.116 As a result, the district court stated that the 
issue of determining ATS corporate liability “remains open to reasonable 
debate.”117 
In Nestle, the district court sought to dispose of several arguments that 
had been made in previous cases in support of corporate liability under the 
ATS. Rather than focusing on what the law should be or why policy should 
encourage corporate responsibility, the Nestle court stated that courts 
should focus on what the law actually asserts.118 The court argued that while 
circuit court decisions—including decisions in Romero v. Drummond and 
Khulumani—have accepted corporate ATS liability, little weight should be 
given to these precedents because they neglect to identify a universal 
standard of international law.119 
The district court reasoned that, although three limited areas were 
originally found to meet the “law of nations” threshold (violation of safe 
                                                                                                                           
 114. Id. at *59–60. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at *61–62. For examples of different approaches, compare id. (citing Khulumani v. 
Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (“the issue 
of whether corporations may be held liable under the [ATS] is indistinguishable from the question 
of whether private individuals may be.”)), with id. (citing Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 
N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1242 (11th Cir.2005) (finding corporate liability under the ATS, without 
even addressing the issue directly)). 
  For example, In re Agent Orange involved a product liability claim against chemical 
companies for the manufacturing of a toxic herbicide used during the Vietnam War. In re Agent 
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
  In any event, even if it were not true that international law recognizes corporations as 
defendants, they still could be sued under the ATS. . . . [T]he Supreme Court made 
clear that an ATS claim is a federal common law claim and it is a bedrock tenet of 
American law that corporations can be held liable for their torts. 
Id. (citing Brief Amici Curiae of the Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Earthrights Int’l and the Int’l 
Human Rights Law Clinic at the Univ. of Va. School of Law at 24–26, In re Agent Orange Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (No. 04 CV 0400 (JBW))). See also Anthea Roberts, The Agent 
Orange Case: Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v. Dow Chemical, 99 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 380, 385 (2005) (discussing that although Judge Weinstein dismissed the 
claims, he “recognized corporate liability under international law and the ATS”).  
 117. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *62(“[D]espite the weight of domestic authority supporting 
that conclusion, this issue remains open to reasonable debate. Notably, the Second Circuit recently 
ordered further briefing on this issue, which reveals that the question is not settled in that 
Circuit.”). 
 118. Id. at *63–64 (fairness and logic argument). 
 119. Id. at *64–65 (domestic court precedent). 
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conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy), these 
causes of action were historically reserved for individual, not corporate, 
liability.120 The Nestle court found that since directors, officers, and 
employees act on behalf of corporations, individuals are responsible for 
violations and should be held accountable, not the corporate entity.121 The 
court argued that this analysis was employed in the Nuremberg Tribunals, 
which interpreted the London Charter to hold individual members, rather 
than organizations, liable for legal offenses.122 Relying on the London 
Charter, the court in Nestle found the Second Circuit’s use of treaties as 
evidence in support of corporate liability in Talisman Energy only 
marginally authoritative.123 Finding that the United Nations conferences did 
not adequately touch on the issue of corporate liability, the district court 
determined that there was no international law standard for corporate 
liability.124 The court argued that international law should not be changed 
simply by asserting a claim or cause of action and seeing if other states 
object.125 Instead, the burden fell on plaintiff to demonstrate that 
international law did recognize corporate liability.126 
III. KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO. 
Similar criticisms against a finding of corporate liability in the 
international law context were employed by the majority in Kiobel, which 
involved claims against Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell 
Transport and Trading Company PLC, acting through a Nigerian 
subsidiary.127 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants aided and abetted the 
Nigerian government in committing human rights abuses against Nigerian 
citizens.128 The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York dismissed some claims it deemed were not recognized by 
international law,129 but denied defendants’ motion to dismiss claims 
relating to “aiding and abetting arbitrary arrest and detention; crimes against 
                                                                                                                           
 120. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
29). 
 121. See Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *67. The Nestle court discussed United States v. Krauch 
for the proposition that the term “corporations” was not meant to reference its legal character and 
was instead “obiter dictum.” Id. (citation omitted). “In other words, the tribunal’s references to the 
company were placeholders meant as shorthand for the individual members of the  
company. . . . [and] were not substantive discussions regarding legal responsibility.” Id. 
 122. Id. at *67–68 (Nuremberg-based precedent). 
 123. Id. at *66–69 (precedent established by treaties and conventions). 
 124. See id. at *70–71 (describing the United Nations conferences relating to the Rome Statute 
as demonstrating the lack of an established standard which has gained global acceptance). 
 125. Id. at *72–73 (international practice). 
 126. Id. at *73 (domestic court reasoning). 
 127. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 124 (dismissing claims of “aiding and abetting property destruction; forced exile; 
extrajudicial killing; and violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association”). 
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humanity; and torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.”130 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the district court certified its entire order for 
interlocutory appeal.131 On appeal, the Second Circuit in Kiobel reasoned 
that “although customary international law has sometimes extended the 
scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to individuals, it has never 
extended the scope of liability to a corporation.”132 As a result, the court 
held that the ATS did not grant jurisdiction over civil claims brought 
against corporate defendants. 
Before Kiobel, the Second Circuit’s approach in determining 
jurisdiction under the ATS had been characterized by legal scholars as 
expansive.133 However, the court’s holding in Kiobel appears to limit 
jurisdiction, finding that the ATS does not confer jurisdiction over claims 
against corporations, thus exempting them from ATS liability. The court 
distinguished its current approach from Khulumani and Talisman Energy 
where the court had held open the possibility of corporate ATS liability. 
Talisman Energy, interestingly, was heard on the same day and by the same 
panel of judges as Kiobel.134 
Despite prior case law on the issue, the court in Kiobel contended that 
past cases did not analyze the issue of corporate liability.135 Commentators 
have not agreed with this position. The court’s decision has been deemed “a 
significant departure from established ATS jurisprudence,”136 “unlikely to 
settle the question as to whether corporations may be held liable under the 
ATS,”137 and described as a decision involving “three complex and 
fractured steps.”138 Unlike Talisman Energy, where the issue of corporate 
liability was fully briefed for the court, but not analyzed in depth, the 
Kiobel court nevertheless took the opportunity to explore corporate 
liability.139 The court reasoned that reviewing subject matter jurisdiction de 
novo was appropriate, regardless of the Second Circuit’s past approach.140 
                                                                                                                           
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 120. 
 133. See Kline, supra note 39, at 695. 
 134. Michael D. Goldhaber, The Supreme Court Could Kill the Corporate Alien Tort Sooner 
Than You Think, THE AM LAW DAILY (Sept. 27, 2010, 6:12 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/ 
amlawdaily/2010/09/corporatealientort.html [hereinafter Goldhaber, Supreme Court]. 
 135. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124. 
 136. Press Release, Harvard Law School, International Human Rights Clinic Files Amicus Brief 
in Corporate Alien Tort Statute Case (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/ 
2010/10/21_ihrc.html. 
 137. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, Second Circuit Holds That Corporations 
Cannot Be Held Liable for Claims Brought Under the Alien Tort Statute, CORPORATE & 
SECURITIES LAW BLOG (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/securities-
litigation-second-circuit-holds-that-corporations-cannot-be-held-liable-for-claims-brought-under-
the-alien-tort-statute.html. 
 138. Goldhaber, Life and Death, supra note 1. 
 139. Goldhaber, Supreme Court, supra note 134. 
 140. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124. 
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The standard to employ when reexamining jurisdiction under the ATS 
was not defined by the Second Circuit in a unanimous decision. Rather, the 
majority and concurring opinions agreed that the complaint should be 
dismissed, but on very different grounds. While the majority rejected the 
existence of corporate liability under the ATS on international law grounds, 
the concurrence argued that the claims for aiding and abetting did not 
satisfy the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as 
required under Iqbal.141 In this case, particularly because of the pre-existing 
circuit split on the issue of corporate liability under the ATS, both the 
majority and concurrence provide valuable commentary. 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
The majority used a two step approach to arrive at the conclusion that 
corporate liability does not exist under the ATS. Step one analyzed whether 
international or domestic law governs the corporate liability inquiry. Step 
two evaluated corporate liability through the lens of international law by 
analyzing tribunals, international treaties, and scholarly work.142 
The majority contended that the question before the court, provoked by 
footnote 20 of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa, was “whether 
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given 
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if defendant is a private actor such as a 
corporation or individual.”143 In part one—relying on the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Sosa—the Kiobel majority concluded that international law 
which is “specific, universal and obligatory”144 governs questions of 
liability under the ATS, not domestic law. Based upon its interpretation of 
footnote 20, the court reasoned that two questions must be answered to 
meet the threshold of international acceptance: “both whether certain 
conduct leads to ATS liability and whether the scope of liability under the 
ATS extends to the defendant being sued.”145 
Part two of the majority’s opinion reviewed sources of international 
law. Relying on and adopting the philosophy of Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), sources of international law 
include: conventions, customs, and general concepts found in civilized 
nations.146 
                                                                                                                           
 141. Id. at 193 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 142. Id. at 125 (majority opinion). In this matter, the label concurring opinion tends to be a 
misnomer, since on the issue of corporate liability, its point of view is better categorized as a 
dissent. 
 143. Id. at 120 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)). 
 144. Id. at 118 n.12 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732). 
 145. Id. at 128. 
 146. Id. at 132. 
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1. International Tribunals and Treaties 
The majority’s opinion is predominantly an analysis of international 
tribunals since the Nuremberg trials. Beginning its discussion, the majority 
stated, “[w]e find it particularly significant, therefore, that no international 
tribunal of which we are aware has ever held a corporation liable for a 
violation of the law of nations.”147 Relying on the Nuremberg Tribunals and 
the London Charter as instructive sources of customary international law 
relating to human rights violations,148 the court highlighted that only 
individual, natural persons, not organizations or entities, could be liable for 
a crime.149 Acknowledging the court’s holding from Filartiga that law 
evolves with time, the court continued its analysis of tribunals beyond the 
Nuremberg period. As previously cited in Khulumani, the court looked to 
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, as well as the Rome Statute for guidance. In finding that the 
jurisdiction of all such tribunals is limited to “natural persons,”150 the court 
concluded that there is no international acceptance of corporate liability.151 
Without distinguishing between civil and criminal liability, the majority 
held that, “[t]he concept of corporate liability for violations of customary 
international law has not achieved universal recognition or acceptance . . . . 
[and the] complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.”152 
Looking to another source of international law, the majority analyzed 
international treaties, analogizing treaties to contracts between nations that 
could mature into customary international law only if adopted and adhered 
to by “an overwhelming majority” of nations.153 Further undermining their 
evidentiary value, the majority highlighted that the scope of liability created 
under a treaty is limited to the specific subject matter of the treaty.154 
Acknowledging that some treaties have imposed liability on corporations, 
the court deemed such instances as insufficient due to their limited 
occurrence.155 
                                                                                                                           
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 132–33. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 477–78 (2001) (discussing the manner in which international 
criminal law during the Nuremberg trials did not foreclose the possibility of corporate liability, but 
rather demonstrated a willingness to consider corporate liability). 
 149. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 133. 
 150. Id. at 136–37 (citing the ICTY, ICTR, and the Rome Statute). 
 151. Id. at 137. 
 152. Id. at 149. 
 153. Id. at 137 (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 154. See id. at 138. 
 155. Id. at 139. 
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2. Legal Experts 
Next, the majority looked to two law professors’ expert opinions 
supporting the notion that corporate liability is not recognized 
internationally. The majority asserted that Professor James Crawford stated 
that “‘no national court [outside the United States] and no international 
judicial tribunal has so far recognized corporate liability, as opposed to 
individual liability, in a civil or criminal context on the basis of a violation 
of the law of nations or customary international law.’”156 Similarly, the 
majority relied on Professor (now Judge) Christopher Greenwood’s 
assertion that “‘there is no[], and never has been, any assertion of the 
criminal liability of corporations in international law.’”157 Beyond these two 
scholars, the majority cited no further academic support.  Instead, it argued 
that the burden is on plaintiffs to establish that a norm of international law 
exists.158 
B. JUDGE LEVAL’S CONCURRENCE 
Judge Leval’s concurrence strongly rejected the majority’s application 
of legal precedent, characterizing the argument as “illogical, internally 
inconsistent, contrary to international law, and incompatible with rulings of 
both the Supreme Court and [the Second Circuit].”159 While agreeing with 
the majority that international law provides the appropriate foundation for 
evaluating ATS liability, the concurrence questioned the majority’s failure 
to distinguish civil from criminal liability. The concurrence argued that for 
issues of civil liability, international law has taken no position and has 
instead allowed individual nations to establish their own standards and 
remedies.160 It concluded that international law compels one to look to 
domestic law when interpreting issues of civil liability. The concurrence 
began by discussing the objectives of international law and proceeds by 
distinguishing civil and criminal liability, and reevaluating the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sosa to support its interpretation that corporate liability 
under the ATS is appropriate. 
1. Policy Arguments in Support of Corporate Liability 
Judge Leval views international law as a compilation of rules that have 
worldwide acceptance, the focus and purpose of which has evolved to 
protect against hostis humani generis conduct and heinous violations of 
                                                                                                                           
 156. Id. at 143 (quoting Declaration of Professor James Crawford ¶ 10, Presbyterian Church of 
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-0016) (emphasis added)). 
 157. Id. at 143 (quoting Second Declaration of Christopher Greenwood ¶ 13, Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9882 (S.D.N.Y July 10, 2002)). 
 158. Id. at 146. 
 159. Id. at 174 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 160. Id. at 153. 
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humanitarian rights.161 His concurrence argued that the majority’s approach 
protects corporations against such violations simply because corporations 
are incorporated. The concurrence went on to posit that the majority’s 
opinion defeats international law’s very objective which is to “protect 
fundamental human rights.”162 Applying the majority’s rule to examples of 
slave trading, piracy, and genocide, the concurrence demonstrates the 
absurd consequences that would result from corporations having unfettered 
protection from liability under international law.163  
2. The Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Liability 
The concurrence acknowledged that a policy argument that runs counter 
to the majority’s approach is insufficient grounds upon which to deem its 
reasoning inappropriate. Rather, Judge Leval questioned the majority’s 
main evidentiary source—international tribunals. Since the ATS involves 
civil liability, Judge Leval questioned the tremendous weight that the 
majority gave to international tribunals, which only have jurisdiction over 
criminal claims.164 The concurrence underscored that the majority’s 
approach assumes that international law equates civil and criminal 
liability.165 Judge Leval argued that international law does distinguish 
between civil and criminal liability and that while corporate criminality is 
not internationally accepted, corporate civil liability does not have the same 
fate.166 
3. Sosa’s Reference to Norms 
The Supreme Court in Sosa defined international law, or law of nations, 
as rules that have received universal acceptance.167 The Kiobel concurrence 
argued however, that “[t]he majority opinion, disregarding the context of 
the Court’s discussion, construes the ‘norm’ under discussion as a 
convention concerning the type of violator of international law upon whom 
civil tort liability may be imposed.”168 As a result, the concurrence 
demonstrated that the majority’s approach inappropriately required that a 
norm for imposing tort liability on a corporate violator must be considered 
universally accepted. 
Judge Leval contended that the tortious conduct must be considered a 
violation of a universally accepted norm of international law. While who 
perpetrates the crime is not irrelevant, the concurrence argued that the 
                                                                                                                           
 161. Id. at 154–55 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)). 
 162. Id. at 154. 
 163. Id. at 155–57. 
 164. Id. at 166. 
 165. Id. at 170–72. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004). 
 168. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 177 (Leval, J., concurring). 
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Supreme Court was distinguishing between conduct committed by or on 
behalf of the State and crimes committed independently of State action.169 
The concurrence interpreted footnote 20 as not distinguishing corporations 
and individuals.170 Additionally, universal acceptance of a remedy—in this 
case civil damages—need not be an international norm.171 The Supreme 
Court was merely distinguishing “between conduct that does, and conduct 
that does not, violate the law of nations.”172 Finally, the concurrence 
criticized the lack of academic support for the majority’s conclusion and its 
failure to cite to any published scholastic work.173 
IV. KIOBEL’S CONCURRENCE AS THE APPROPRIATE 
APPROACH 
Some courts have already adopted the majority’s reasoning from 
Kiobel.174 However, the statutory language of the ATS creates an 
ambiguous standard that fails to specify the identity of potential defendants 
or causes of action, or to differentiate between criminal and civil 
violations.175 Matters are further complicated by the ATS’s hybrid nature, 
which, according to Michael Koebele, “combines both the public and the 
private sphere because it does not only incorporate public international law 
by reference but equally forms part of federal torts law.”176 Due to the 
court’s reliance in Kiobel on international law as providing the standard for 
ATS liability, the focal point of the court’s analysis should have been 
dependent on how international law responds to civil liability, specifically. 
A. DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CRIMINAL 
AND CIVIL LIABILITY? 
If international law fails to distinguish between civil and criminal 
liability, the majority’s reliance on international tribunals may have firm 
footing. However, “[i]nternational law distinguishes clearly between [civil 
and criminal liability] and provides differently for the different objectives of 
criminal punishment and civil compensatory liability.”177 Accordingly, the 
Kiobel concurrence appropriately criticized the majority’s approach since 
                                                                                                                           
 169. Id. 
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 171. Id. at 176–77. 
 172. Id. at 177. 
 173. Id. at 181. 
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international tribunals have only evaluated issues related to criminal, not 
civil, liability. 
As highlighted by the concurrence, criminal law and civil law have 
distinct standards and objectives. While one purpose of criminal liability is 
to punish a perpetrator for wrongdoing, civil liability seeks to compensate 
victims for a harm caused to them.178 Furthermore, both have different 
burdens of proof; criminal law requires that elements of a given crime be 
established “beyond a reasonable doubt,” a higher evidentiary standard than 
civil law, which requires only that liability be established “by a 
preponderance of the evidence”.179 
While the majority in Kiobel supports its finding of no corporate 
liability in part based on the Nuremberg Trials, other conclusions may be 
drawn from the Nuremberg cases.180 The absence of corporate defendants in 
these cases does not necessarily equate to a finding of no corporate liability, 
particularly because the trials discussed corporations’ responsibilities and 
obligations even without a named corporate defendant.181 
B. “SPECIFIC, UNIVERSAL, AND OBLIGATORY”182 
Although the Kiobel concurrence argued that in order to find a party 
liable under the ATS, the requirement of an internationally accepted norm 
need only apply to the tortious conduct, the majority suggests that 
international law also governs whether a particular defendant can be found 
liable for the corresponding tort.183 Regardless of this distinction, the 
concurrence’s approach should nevertheless prevail. Defining customary 
international law is a challenging prospect and even the majority in Kiobel 
acknowledges that numerous sources of case law, treaties, and academic 
writing must be consulted when making such a determination.184 If that is 
                                                                                                                           
 178. Id. at 169. 
 179. Both the majority and concurrence agree that international criminal law does not have 
jurisdiction over corporate defendants; therefore, this note does not discuss corporate criminality 
in the international sector in detail. 
 180. See, e.g., Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 155 n.7 (Leval, J., concurring) (explaining that civil liability 
was not imposed on corporate executives in the Nuremberg Trials in order to highlight a flaw in 
the majority’s reasoning. Since civil damages were not awarded against the executives, 
international law should not, yet nevertheless does, find natural persons civilly liable). 
 181. See Ratner, supra note 148, at 477. 
 182. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, 
Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). The structure for analyzing corporate 
rights and duties is based upon the framework employed in a United Nations Report. U.N. Special 
Representative of the Sec’y Gen., Human Rights Council, Report on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 
9, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Report]. 
 183. Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights & Labor Orgs. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ 
Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 
F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 06-4800-CV, 06-4876-CV) [hereinafter Brief for Human Rights & 
Labor]. 
 184. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 131. 
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the case, then the current trend in international law toward the regulation of 
corporations is one the majority should have considered.185 
1. Corporate Rights 
In a time of vast globalization, foreign investment, and trade, 
corporations have been afforded rights as a consequence of their ever 
expanding relationship with host governments and countries.186 Although 
sometimes viewed as a threat by developing countries due to the difficulty 
of monitoring multinational corporations, international law has nevertheless 
integrated corporate rights protection in order to ensure future 
investment.187 
Corporations have been found to have international rights in numerous 
areas of law. Corporations can enforce “long-term development contracts 
with foreign states,” protect their land rights against expropriation, and 
implement international arbitration agreements.188 In addition, U.S. 
corporations may now even enjoy freedom of speech protection.189 “If 
corporations have rights under international law, by parity of reasoning, 
they must have duties as well.”190 
2. Corporate Duties 
While nations have been inconsistent in establishing regulations on 
foreign corporations, evidence suggests international acceptance of 
corporate liability.191 In 2005, the Special Representative of the United 
Nations Secretary-General (SRSG), John Ruggie, was asked by United 
Nations Human Rights Commission to: 
 
 identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and 
accountability for businesses and human rights; 
 clarify the implications for businesses of concepts such as 
“complicity” and “sphere of influence”; 
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 develop materials and methodologies for undertaking human 
rights impact assessments of the activities of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises[].192 
 
Pursuant to his role as SRSG, Ruggie sought to find evidence of 
international corporate legal responsibilities over a nine year period.193 In a 
report written in February of 2007, the issue of whether corporate 
responsibility for human rights violations exists under international law was 
explored.194 While the report does not suggest that a clear and concise body 
of law has developed on the issue, its analysis of “soft law”195 and other 
international sources suggests a growing trend towards deeming corporate 
liability appropriate under international law standards.196  
a. Indirect Responsibilities 
As the court outlined in Sosa, and the Second Circuit adopted in Kiobel, 
in order for a cause of action to be viable under the ATS it must be 
“specific, universal, and obligatory.”197 Even the majority in Kiobel 
acknowledged, however, that if these requirements are taken to their most 
extreme boundaries, individual liability may not even meet the necessary 
threshold because “international law has [only] sometimes extended the 
scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to individuals.”198 At what 
point does a standard become obligatory and when is there enough 
evidentiary support to draw the conclusion that a norm has been 
established? The same questions can be asked when defining 
universality.199 Still, the Kiobel majority suggested that liability has “never” 
been found against corporations.200 
Never is a particularly strong term, but is, at the same time, fairly easy 
to rebuff. Soft law is informative in determining a nation’s perspective on a 
particular area of law without requiring the formality of legally binding 
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mandates.201 The International Labour Organization (ILO), an agency 
within the United Nations, is comprised of governments, employers, and 
workers whose shared mission is to promote employment rights and 
opportunities.202 Under their Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, corporate duties 
include: favoring hiring locally, protecting employee health and safety, and 
allowing for the organization and collective bargaining of workers.203 By 
highlighting that corporations have obligations under the ILO, which are 
agreed to by “governments, industry, and labor,” there is “a sense among 
those three constituencies that corporations have duties toward their 
employees.”204 
Guidelines reported by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD) have similarly required that corporations 
conduct their operations in a particular manner.205 While finding that 
corporations should protect against human rights abuses abroad, the OECD 
fails to specify which rights are of particular concern.206 Still, by directly 
addressing corporate actors, the guidelines show a “capacity and 
willingness of states to implement their international human rights 
obligations” through corporations.207 
b. Direct Responsibilities 
In First National City Bank (FNCB) v. Banco Para El Comercio 
Exterio De Cuba, the Supreme Court arguably engaged in the concurrence’s 
suggested approach in Kiobel.208 A Cuban bank brought suit against an 
American bank for an unpaid letter of credit in which the American bank 
counterclaimed for the value of their assets that were seized in Cuba.209 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that having a corporate form with juridical status 
did not protect the Cuban bank against liability even though the 
expropriation of the assets was executed by the Cuban government.210 The 
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Court looked to international law which directed them to domestic rules,211 
ultimately finding the bank liable. Given that the Court performed a similar 
analysis to reach a different conclusion—corporate civil liability—as the 
Kiobel majority, the latter’s view that corporations have never been found 
liable under international law does not hold up.212 While there may be a 
presumption that domestic law applies only to the nation which enacted it, a 
more flexible approach has been employed by the Supreme Court, 
acknowledging that the United States and international courts have 
overridden this presumption for the protection of equity and justice.213 
Alternatively, there are instances in which liability has been directly 
imposed on corporations. In the environmental law context, international 
treaties have enabled liability to attach directly to polluters, including 
corporations.214 In addition, anti-corruption laws have created duties that are 
binding on corporations.215 Through treaties, the European Union has also 
“created a vast body of legal obligations which apply directly to corporate 
entities.”216 For example, the Treaty of Rome has sought to regulate 
behavior and corporate liability.217 Such duties include mandates against 
anticompetitive behavior and regulations with which corporations must 
comply.218 
C. POLICY 
Legal arguments against the implementation of corporate ATS liability 
have often taken a policy approach. Opponents of corporate liability have 
addressed the potential threat that an overbroad interpretation would create 
a “flood” of ATS litigation.219 A brief reflection on the history of ATS legal 
precedent,220 however, strongly questions the validity of such a concern, 
considering the small number of cases that have been brought and have 
                                                                                                                           
 211. Id. at 621. 
 212. Id. at 621–22. 
To give conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state in determining whether the 
separate juridical status of its instrumentality should be respected would permit the state 
to violate with impunity the rights of third parties under international law while 
effectively insulating itself from liability in foreign courts. We decline to permit such a 
result.  
Id. (citing for comparison Anderson v. Abott, 321 U.S. 349, 365 (1944)). See also Brief for 
Human Rights & Labor, supra note 183. 
 213. First Nat’l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 628–29. 
 214. Ratner, supra note 148, at 479–80. 
 215. Id. at 482. 
 216. Id. at 484. 
 217. See Loïc Lerouge, Moral Harassment in the Workplace: French Law and European 
Perspectives, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 109, 145 (2010). 
 218. Ratner, supra note 148, at 484. 
 219. Koh, supra note 190, at 263. 
 220. See discussion supra Part II. 
598 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
survived procedural dismissals.221 Along these same lines, concern that an 
expansive approach to ATS liability would lead to corporate liability due to 
an enterprise’s mere presence in a nation where tortious conduct was taking 
place neglects the legal precedent that has required purpose in establishing 
aiding and abetting liability.222 
The most prominent policy question that flows from the majority’s 
decision in Kiobel is whether corporations should really be free from 
liability under the ATS merely because they filed the appropriate 
documents to incorporate. After all, corporations obtain tremendous profits 
as a result of their international presence, particularly in regions where the 
cost of business is significantly cheaper. As noted by the concurring 
opinion in Kiobel, “[a]ccording to the rule my colleagues have created, one 
who earns profits by commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental 
human rights can successfully shield those profits from victims’ claims for 
compensation simply by taking the precaution of conducting the heinous 
operation in the corporate form.”223 
The true impact of Kiobel is hotly debated. Some commentators have 
suggested that ATS litigation will simply switch gears, focusing efforts on 
individual directors and officers.224 On the other hand, litigators have 
strategically withdrawn lawsuits until the standard for determining ATS 
liability is better established.225 
CONCLUSION 
ATS liability for corporations allows alien plaintiffs to be compensated 
in U.S. district courts for serious, tortious misconduct committed abroad. 
While the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel does not eliminate the 
opportunity for plaintiffs to bring actions against corporate officers, 
directors, or employees, corporations have the deep pockets.226 A 
determination that corporations are not liable due to the lack of a 
universally accepted norm under international law inappropriately 
categorizes the structure and mechanism of international corporate law. 
Giving nations the independent ability to determine remedies for violations 
delineated in international treaties eliminates the ability to find a norm of 
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corporate liability. Supreme Court review is required in order to establish a 
more defined standard. Evidentiary support for corporate liability from 
international treaties, conferences, and tribunals strongly suggests that the 
ATS is not dead and the Kiobel majority’s reasoning is fundamentally 
flawed and, hopefully, short lived. 
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